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An Efficient Leakage Free Countermeasure of AES against 
Side Channel Attacks 
Abdulaziz Miyajan, Ph.D 
University of Connecticut, 2016 
ABSTRACT 
Across generations many electronic devices have become more popular starting 
from cell phones, tablets, laptops, desktops and any communication devices. 
Globalization and various treaties have resulted in increased outsourcing of data, 
software, hardware and various services. This increases the need to protect data and 
information whether transmitted, processed, stored or distributed, which results in 
developing many cryptographic algorithms to secure different types of hardware and 
software. In 2001, the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) selected 
Rijndael as the advanced encryption standard (AES) [1]. The security of AES has 
received considerable attention, which encourages the community to compete in 
developing many hardware and software implementations for AES. AES has become the 
widely used encryption primitive to protect electronic data in many applications and 
platforms. Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are a real and successful threat to AES. SCAs 
obtain secret keys by exploiting the physical leakage of information from executing 
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cryptographic algorithms such as those for power consumption, electromagnetic 
radiation, running time and cache profile information. In power and electromagnetic 
analysis attacks, the observable leakages are the power consumption and the 
electromagnetic radiation of the device, which are dependent on the processed data and 
the performed operations. Masking is a common and widely used countermeasure to 
defeat differential power analysis (DPA) and differential electromagnetic analysis 
(DEMA) attacks. In timing attacks which can be carried out remotely (e.g. over networks 
[2]), the observable leakage is the execution time variation to respond to queries or 
perform cryptographic operations that depend on critical data or secret keys. Having a 
constant-time implementation is a sound countermeasure to mitigate timing attacks. In 
cache attacks, an observable leakage (covert channel) about which part of the look-up 
table was accessed, might be revealed by the cache. One way to mitigate cache attacks is 
by having an implementation that does not use lookup tables. Another way is by using 
Data-Oblivious Memory Access Pattern. The second technique requires a small 
increment of memory but is more efficient, while the first one solves the memory 
overhead problem with negative impact on the performance. This thesis proposes an 
efficient, leakage-free countermeasure of AES, against multiple side channel attacks, 
meanwhile avoiding as much as we can, the negative impact in the performance as a 
result of combining those countermeasures, and the memory overhead that results from 
storing lookup tables. 
The first part of the thesis focuses on techniques to produce an efficient leakage-
free countermeasure of AES against power analysis, electromagnetic emissions, timing 
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and cache attacks. This countermeasure features a secure higher-order masking scheme 
(to defeat power and electromagnetic attacks), the elimination of lookup tables (to 
mitigate cache attacks and remove memory overhead), and a constant-time 
implementation (to defend against timing attacks). However, combining these 
countermeasures imposes a negative impact on performance.  Therefore, we propose 
techniques to solve the performance problem at the algorithm and data levels. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on the bottleneck transformation of the AES 
which is the SubByte transformation. This thesis demonstrates the techniques, presenting 
an application of efficient SubByte transformation by working in three different levels: 
algorithm, byte and bit levels.  
The last part of the thesis focuses on the inversion operation which is the first part 
of the SubByte transformation, utilizing the squaring property of the normal basis. 
Consequently, these masks need to be converted between the two forms (polynomial and 
normal basis) based on the sequence of operations. This thesis presents a low cost basis 
conversion technique that can be applied with or without using lookup tables. Moreover, 
this thesis presents efficient and secure techniques, which mitigate cache attacks and 
further improve the running time of the algorithm, in exchange for a small memory 
requirement.  
Finally, to verify our work we deployed the several techniques in a real 
application (OpenSSL framework) as a case study.  
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 CHAPTER 1
Introduction 
 
1.1 History and motivations 
As electronic devices become more popular, the need to protect transmitted, 
processed, stored and distributed data increases. The security of different types of 
hardware and software has become a major and critical concern, and has resulted in the 
development of cryptographic algorithms. Since 2001, when the National Institute of 
Standards and Technologies (NIST) selected Rijndael as the advanced encryption 
standard (AES) [3], many hardware and software implementations of AES have been 
proposed and it has become the most popularly used encryption primitive. Many 
applications in different platforms, from high-end servers to mobile consumer products, 
use AES as the encryption primitive to protect their electronic data. Network 
communication protocols that use AES include TSL, VPNs, Wi-Fi, MTP and SSL. 
Automated teller machines (ATMs) use AES to securely transmit sensitive information to 
their information processing centers [4]. Cloud computing is being used for applications 
such as social networking, online document services, email, backup, secure multiparty 
computation (SMC), banking, and financial services, which are retrieving and 
manipulating previously stored data in the Cloud. For privacy and integrity reasons, AES 
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is used to encrypt data before storage and to decrypt the data when retrieving them. 
Hackers’ attention is therefore focused on AES. Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are a real 
and successful threat to AES. SCAs obtain secret keys by exploiting the physical leakage 
of information from executing cryptographic algorithms such as those for power 
consumption, electromagnetic radiation, timing variations and cache profile information 
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]. 
Extensive efforts have been made to propose countermeasures against SCAs at 
the hardware level. However, less has been proposed at the software level, which is also 
critical and subject to improvement. Cache attacks, and many design techniques for their 
mitigation are discussed in [9] [10]. One way to mitigate cache attacks is by having an 
implementation that does not use lookup tables. Another way is the Data-Oblivious 
Memory Access Pattern that will be discussed later. Timing attacks are made possible by 
visibility of the variability of execution time of a code due to conditional branches that 
depend on critical data or secret keys [7]. Indeed, developing a countermeasure to 
mitigate timing attacks can be achieved by having a constant-time implementation of the 
protected algorithm [11]. One benefit from using SIMD technology in our work is to 
obtain a constant-time implementation. Differential power analysis (DPA) and 
differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) [6] are two different types of serious SCAs 
that are non-invasive and can be mounted without any knowledge about the targeted 
device; the first one is targeting the power consumption while the later one is targeting 
the electromagnetic radiation; both have to use the same statistical techniques to explore 
some important information to obtain the secret key. These types of attacks cannot be 
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detected by a device because they are non-invasive and passive, exploiting externally 
available information using cheap equipment without direct access to the interior of the 
target device. As a result, traditional attack detectors are ineffective and the 
countermeasure designers will need to ensure that power consumption of the device does 
not correlate with the sensitive information being processed. Hiding and masking are two 
well-investigated solutions at the algorithmic level, where the first one makes the leakage 
constant while the other one makes the leakage dependent on some random value. In this 
thesis, we will focus on the masking strategy. 
Masking is a common and widely employed countermeasure to protect block 
cipher implementations against SCAs especially at the software level. In masking, for 
every execution of the algorithm, the input data and the secret key (sensitive intermediate 
variables) are obscured with fresh and randomly selected bits. Therefore, all the 
computations at the algorithm level are masked until the end of the last round to break the 
correlation between the secret key and the actual power consumption. The final results 
are unmasked to retrieve the correct results. Several first order masking schemes are 
proposed in [12]. Due to this, adversaries generalized the principle, exploiting several 
leakage points at the same time; this is often referred to as higher-order SCA. To mitigate 
this type of attack higher-order masking countermeasures are proposed but their 
execution consumes a significant amount of time. Cryptosystem engineers have since 
been focusing on designing efficient higher-order masking countermeasures [12] [13]. 
The first provably secure higher-order masking scheme was proposed in [14]. 
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In [14], the OpenSSL, which is an open source library collection of many 
cryptographic protocols [15], implementation of the AES algorithm was exploited by 
electromagnetic SCA using an Intel Atom processor. Furthermore, in [16] the OpenSSL 
implementation of the AES algorithm was exploited by a cache timing SCA using a 
Pentium III processor. Moreover, in [8], electromagnetic attacks were successfully 
mounted on modern laptop and desktop systems with various Intel processors. 
  Unfortunately, applying one countermeasure against one of the SCAs can mitigate 
that type but might leave the cryptographic implementation vulnerable to another type of 
attack. The above issues inspired us to produce a combined countermeasure to mitigate 
different types of SCA simultaneously. However, applying each countermeasure will 
cause a serious impact on the performance or memory requirements. Remarkably, we 
face three challenges, the security of AES against multiple SCAs at the same time, the 
performance impact and the memory overhead to store lookup tables. These challenges 
can be overcome through the development of a combined countermeasure that will secure 
AES from those attacks while including techniques to improve the performance and solve 
the memory overhead issue. This can be achieved by combining a provably secure 
higher-order masking scheme (to defeat power and electromagnetic attacks), and a 
constant-time implementation (to defend against timing attacks), with either the 
elimination the use of lookup tables or use of Data-Oblivious Memory Access Pattern (to 
mitigate cache attacks and remove or reduce memory overhead), followed by speed up 
techniques on algorithm, byte and bit level. 
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The thesis focuses on the implementation of various beneficial aspects of 
cryptography, more specifically how to properly integrate multiple security techniques 
into one solution, so that the implementation not only greatly increases the security, but 
also in an efficient manner. Although algorithmic security has reached a proven degree of 
success in providing security, obtaining physical security of a cryptographic 
implementation while maintaining an acceptable speed, is much more difficult to 
accomplish. Due to the increasing demand for the address of flaws in implementation, 
cryptographic engineering, a new discipline has  rapidly developed, which focuses 
specifically on security and efficiency of cryptographic implementations. 
1.2 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the art and science of using mathematics to produce protocols, 
algorithms and techniques to hide and secure sensitive information in transit in the 
presence of adversaries. (Originally, it was focused only on the problem of secret 
communication.) Thus, securing the sensitive information (called plaintext), requires 
converting it into indecipherable format (ciphertext) using a special secure process 
(called encryption) before accessing over an untrusted medium (e.g., Internet), and 
converting it back (by the authorized recipient), into the original plaintext using a special 
secure process (called decryption)  when retrieving it over that untrusted medium. Even if 
an adversary succeeds in accessing the ciphertext, he or she will not be able to recover 
the plaintext from it.  Combining those encryption and decryption algorithms introduces a 
new terminology called cipher. 
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In the late 20th century, a new terminology (called modern cryptography) was 
raised with the invention of computers, cell smart phones, tablets and other 
communication devices to solve more problems than confidentiality such as 
authentication, Integrity, exchanging secret keys, non-repudiation, etc. Commonly, 
modern cryptography focuses on: 
 Confidentiality: the intended recipient is the only one who can decrypt the 
ciphertext to extract the original plaintext.  
 Authentication: the intended recipient is able to verify the identity of the sender 
from the received message. 
 Integrity: the intended recipient is able to verify that the message has not been 
changed during the transition process from the received message. 
 Non-repudiation: to ensure that the sender cannot deny sending the message 
later. 
In [17], they define modern cryptography to be “The scientific study of 
techniques for securing digital information, transactions, and distributed computations”. 
Today, cryptographic algorithms are integrated in every computer system. Cryptographic 
algorithms are used in many applications such as enforcing access control in multi-user 
operating systems, preventing extracting secrets from stolen devices, and preventing 
copying, etc. Thus, cryptography has gone from strictly securing communication to 
helping secure systems everywhere, to receiving intense study within computer science. 
In modern cryptography, the attacker is assumed to be aware of the algorithm but not the 
cryptographic key, which is used by the algorithm to determine the output. Cryptographic 
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algorithms can be classified based on the number of keys employed for encryption and 
decryption into three types: 
1. Hash Functions: Does not use any key since it is a one way mapping and 
unrecoverable as shown in Fig.1. 
Hash Functions: also called message digests are an efficient one way mapping 
that takes the entire message as input (no secret key required) to compute a short fixed 
length string called hash value, in which the plaintext is non-reversible by any means. 
Collisions (where two input messages produce the same hash value using the same hash 
function), to break the hash function, are excessively difficult to find. In the security 
field, hash functions widely provide data integrity, digital fingerprints, password 
encryption etc. Examples of commonly used hash algorithms include Secure Hash 
Algorithm [18] (SHA-1 [19], SHA-2 [18], and SHA-3), Message Digest (MD) algorithms 
(MD2 [20], MD4 [21], and MD5 [22]), RIPEMD [23], etc. 
2. Secret (Symmetric) Key Cryptography (SKC): Uses a single key for both 
encryption and decryption as shown in Fig.2. 
 
 
 
 
Plaintext Ciphertext 
Hash 
Function 
Figure 1 Hash Function 
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Secret Key Cryptography: also called symmetric encryption is another type 
of cryptographic algorithm where the sender and the receiver must use the same secret 
key for encrypting the plaintext and decrypting the ciphertext. For security purposes, the 
secret key must be known for both parties (the sender and the receiver) before starting the 
communication, which makes the key distribution between both parties the most difficult 
part. In general, secret or Symmetric Key cryptography are classified into stream ciphers 
or block ciphers. 
Stream ciphers encrypt the plaintext by combining single bits, bytes, or computer 
words, at a time with a continuously changed key stream, using the exclusive-or (Xor) 
operation. Stream ciphers apply some form of feedback mechanism to create a stream of 
key material with arbitrary length that is equal to the length of the message, moreover 
ensuring that the key stream is continuously changed. Stream ciphers, when combine the 
plaintext bit-by-bit, byte-by-byte or character-by-character with the key stream, will 
behave similarly to the one-time pad. In a stream cipher, the output stream is generated 
Figure 2: Symmetric Key Cryptography [24] 
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based on the internal state of the cipher, which changes according to how the cipher is 
designed. That state change in stream ciphers is manipulated either by the key, or in some 
instances by the stream of plaintext [24]. Stream ciphers come in several types but self-
synchronizing stream ciphers and synchronous stream ciphers, in particular, have much 
more importance in application than the others. Examples of commonly used and well 
known stream cipher are Rivest Ciphers (RC1, RC2 [25], RC3, RC4 [26], RC5 and RC6 
[27]). 
A block cipher [28], in comparison to a stream cipher, is named based on how it 
functions. After dividing the plaintext into blocks based on the acceptable block length of 
the used cipher, the same secret key will be applied to encrypt each block in the scheme. 
Therefore, encrypting multiple identical plaintext blocks will always correspond to the 
same ciphertext in a block cipher, however, in a stream cipher, using the same plaintext 
will encrypt to different ciphertext. Examples of block ciphers include DES (Data 
Encryption Standard [29] [30]) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard [3] [31] [32]). 
Figure 3: Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption [52] 
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There are several modes of operation that have been recommended in [33] for 
symmetric key block ciphers, the most important of which are Electronic Codebook, 
Cipher Block Chaining, Cipher Feedback, and Output Feedback. 
 Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode is the least complex, most common, and 
most apparent in applications. An ECB mode uses the same secret key to encrypt 
each individual block of the plaintext to produce a ciphertext block, which makes 
it easy to parallelize the encryption process using multiple processors as shown in 
Figure 3: Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption and makes this mode 
prone to brute force attacks. Therefore any two identical plaintext blocks will 
generate the same ciphertext block when using the secret key. 
 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is the most complex mode and functions 
by adding a feedback mechanism to the encryption scheme. In CBC, the plaintext 
is exclusively-ORed (XORed) with the ciphertext block before it, prior to 
encryption as shown in Figure 4. This mode is impossible to parallelize because 
each input for each block is dependent on the output of the block before it. 
Figure 4: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption 
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Therefore any two identical plaintext blocks will never generate the same 
ciphertext block when using the secret key.  
 Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is also a block cipher implementation, however, 
it is a self-synchronizing cipher. CFB mode delays Xoring plaintext compared to 
CBC. Both permit data to be encrypted in units smaller than the block size, (such 
as byte-by byte) which might be useful in some applications such as encrypting 
interactive terminal input. In 1-byte CFB mode, for example, each incoming byte 
is placed into a shift register, encrypted bit by bit, and the block transmitted. At 
the receiving side, the ciphertext is decrypted and the extra bits in the block (i.e., 
everything above and beyond the one byte) are discarded. 
 Output Feedback (OFB) mode is a block cipher implementation that uses a 
weaker tap location for feedback, and is to a synchronous stream cipher. This 
feedback prevents the same plaintext block from generating the same ciphertext 
block while being independent of both the plaintext and ciphertext bitstreams. 
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3. Public Key Cryptography (PKC): Uses two keys, one for encryption and 
another for decryption. 
Public key cryptography: also called asymmetric key cryptography is another 
type of cryptographic algorithms where the sender uses the recipient’s public key to 
encrypt the plaintext and the recipient uses his own private key to decrypt the ciphertext 
and extract the original message as shown in Figure 5. PKC is one of the greatest 
developments in cryptography in hundreds of years.  Public key cryptography relies on 
the concept of one way functions in order for two parties to engage in secure 
communication without the use of the same key, over non-secure channels. One way 
functions are mathematical functions that are easy for a computer to solve, while the 
inverse of the same function is anticipated to be difficult. For example, two numbers can 
be multiplied to get a product, but factoring that product to get two numbers can be 
Figure 5 Public Key Cryptography [35] 
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difficult as many pairs of factors can be used to get a product. The same applies to 
logarithmic functions as the user can choose what number they would like to raise to a 
desired power. However, finding the two numbers using the inverse would have many 
possibilities and take a considerable amount of time to solve. There are two types of 
public key algorithms: 
 Encryption Algorithms: this type uses two different keys (public key to encrypt 
and private key to decrypt) to solve the confidentiality problem. The most 
commonly used public key encryption algorithm today is RSA [34]. 
 Digital signature algorithms: this type uses two different keys (private key to 
sign the message and the public key to verify the signature) to solve the 
authentication problem. The most commonly used digital signature algorithm 
today is DSA [35]. 
1.3 Advance Encryption standard (AES) 
In the 1970’s, IBM developed Data Encryption Standard (DES), which later was 
broken by the supercomputer in less than 24 hours. In 2001, a new sophisticated 
algorithm called Rijndael, proposed by Vincent Rijmen and John Daemon, was selected 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to be the advanced 
encryption standard (AES).  
AES is a symmetric key block cipher that must use the same secret key for 
encryption and decryption [19]. AES has a mathematical formulation in the field GF(28), 
where the addition is the XOR operation (denoted by ⊕) and the multiplication (denoted 
by •) of polynomials modulo the irreducible polynomial n(x) = x8+ x4+ x3+ x+1; (0x11B 
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in hexadecimal representation). Before AES begins encryption, the data must first be 
arranged in a two-dimensional (4 rows by 4 columns) matrix of bytes called the state 
matrix. The AES algorithm has to satisfy the properties of key mixing, substitution, and 
linear transformation layers in the evaluation of all of its n rounds to produce the cipher 
text. The number of rounds n is slightly different based on the key length. There are three 
key lengths that are suitable with AES (128, 192, and 256); the corresponding numbers of 
rounds are 10, 12 and 14 respectively. Hence each AES round consists of four major 
transformations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The last round, 
however, avoids the MixColumns transformation [1]. In the SubBytes transformation, the 
state matrix bytes are replaced using Rijndael’s S-Box in case the whole lookup table is 
stored. On the other hand, it can be calculated for each element of the state matrix by 
applying two operations, the multiplicative inverse using the power function x→ x254 over 
the Galois field GF(28) followed by the affine transformation to achieve the substitution 
layer role. ShiftRows is the simplest transformation; the four rows are cyclically shifted 
left by n-1 bytes; so, zero, one, two and three respectively. MixColumns is a column-wise 
linear transformation rather than row-wise as in the previous one. It multiplies each 
column by a fixed 4 × 4 matrix as in (5). The linear layer role is satisfied with these two 
transformations. In AddRoundKey, each byte in the state matrix is XORed with the 
corresponding round key to meet the key mixing layer role. 
1.4 Cryptanalysis 
The objective of a cryptanalyst, someone who conducts cryptanalysis, is to figure 
out the breakdown of a cryptographic algorithm (either from the mathematical or the 
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implementation side ) in order to find the secret key, that helps decrypt all previous and 
new messages using that secret key. The process of determining the secret key of a 
cryptographic algorithm is known as an attack. A brute force attack is when an attacker 
performs a search on all the possible key candidates, and in the process determines the 
correct key. Moreover, if the attacker is able to find any fragility in the algorithm that 
reduces the complication of finding the secret key compared with the brute force 
technique, this attack succeeds. The goal of the cipher is to make the key and the 
encrypted message secure and prevent a brute force attack. In cryptanalysis, the details of 
the cryptographic algorithm are usually known to the attackers. Hence, based on the type 
and amount of information available, cryptanalytic attackers are classified into many 
types including: 
 Ciphertext only attack: is the case when the attacker has control or access to 
multiple encrypted (ciphertext) messages using the same secret key. 
 Known plaintext attack: is the case when the attacker has control or access to 
multiple messages (plaintext) and the produced encrypted (ciphertext) messages. 
 Chosen plaintext attack: is the case when the attacker has control or access to 
encryption device. So, the attacker can encrypt multiple messages (plaintext) of 
his own choice and can produce the equivalent encrypted (ciphertext) messages. 
 Chosen ciphertext attack: is the case when the attacker has control or access to 
encryption device. So, the attacker can decrypt multiple encrypted (ciphertext) 
messages of his own choice and obtain the equivalent decrypted (plaintext) 
messages. 
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 Side channel attacks: is the case when the attacker can utilize the side channel 
information of running the cryptographic algorithms on any device such as power 
consumption, electromagnetic radiation, timing variations etc.  
1.5 Implementation or Physical Attacks 
In the literature cryptographic primitive is considered from two points of views: 
classical or traditional cryptanalysis and the physical security. Classical cryptanalysis 
exploits the mathematical weaknesses in the algorithm to find the secret key, while 
implementation or physical attacks exploits the physical leakage information from 
running the primitive cryptographic algorithm on electronic devices that present a 
specific characteristics to recover the secret key involved in the computations. In fact, the 
security of the cryptographic algorithm is very important, but the security of the whole 
system is much more important to be considered, i.e the cryptographic device that 
executes the cryptographic algorithm. Thus, cryptographic devices as defined in [36] in 
page 3 “cryptographic devices are electronic devices that implement cryptographic 
algorithms and store cryptographic keys”. Cryptographic devices manufactures take into 
consideration the implementation attacks seriously because they are much more powerful 
and dangerous than the traditional attacks from their point of view.  
In the literature implementation or physical attacks are classified based on two 
criteria:  
 Invasive vs. non-invasive attacks: in the invasive attacks the attacker can 
control the cryptographic device, where he can depackage the chip, in order to 
observe the behavior or modify the functionality of the chip. It is the strongest 
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and most costly type of physical attacks. In the non-invasive attacks the attacker 
can only observe the external phenomena of the cryptographic device. It is 
inexpensive.  
 Active vs. Passive attacks: in the active attack the attacker tries to manipulate the 
functionality of the cryptographic device, aiming to induce abnormal behavior 
that results errors in the computations, to recover the secret key. As an example of 
this type of attacks include fault attacks [37] [38]. In the passive attacks the 
attacker utilizes the observable phenomena (leakage of information) from the 
physical implementation of the cryptographic algorithm during the execution. 
This type of attacks include power analysis attacks, which utilize the power 
consumption of the cryptographic device while running a certain operation 
depends on the secret key to collect some information about that key in order to 
recover it as in [36]. Second classes are timing attacks, which utilize the execution 
time variation of the same operation or algorithm for different inputs [7] [39]. 
Third classes are electromagnetic attacks, which utilize the correlation between 
the electromagnetic emanations produced by running the cryptographic algorithm 
and the secret key [40] [14]. 
1.6 Side Channel Attacks 
Side channel attacks are a class of implementation attacks, where the attacker 
obtains secret keys by exploiting the physical leakage of information from executing 
cryptographic algorithms such as those from power consumption, electromagnetic 
radiation, timing variation and cache profile information. Side channel attacks are non-
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invasive, passive and are very easy to mount using inexpensive equipment. In practice, 
they are a serious threat to cryptographic devices starting from high-end servers such as 
dedicated cryptographic servers to small embedded devices such as smart cards. Side 
channel attacks were first introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996 [7]. The most successfully 
mounted side channel attacks include power analysis attacks [6], electromagnetic attacks 
[40], timing attacks [7] and cache attacks [41].  
 Timing attacks. Cryptographic algorithms consume different amounts of time to 
process different inputs, due to the data dependent (non-fixed) running time of 
different operations [42]. For example, in the square-and-multiply method, if the 
square operation is performed on a 0, there are no operations, vs. if the bit is 1, 
then one square and multiply operation is performed. Those time variation 
measurements from any vulnerable system are utilized by the attacker to recover 
the secret key. In this type of attack the attacker assumed to know the design of 
the cryptographic system.  
 Cache attacks. In modern CPUs that use the structure of memory caches, a cross-
process information leakage is feasible as a result of the indirect interaction 
between those running processes sharing a processor. The cache works as a 
shared resource for all processes where it affects and gets affected by each 
process. Virtual memory mechanisms are used to protect the data stored in the 
cache, while the metadata and memory access patterns are not fully protected. 
Attackers can utilize the leakage information about the memory access patterns of 
another process, which affect the state of the cache (during or after encryption) 
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and the running time of the encryption. Similar to timing attacks, attackers can 
utilize the time it takes for cache hit/miss, to perform cache-timing attacks. 
Another way is, if the attacker is able to find which part of the lookup table was 
recently visited or the memory access patterns. Cache attacks include two families 
of attacks; Synchronous Known-Data Attacks and Asynchronous Attacks. For 
more details refer to [41]. 
 Power analysis attacks. A power analysis attack is one of the most effective side 
channel attacks. The power consumed by a circuit in any electronic device varies 
based on transistor activity and other components. In fact, the electronic device’s 
power consumption includes information about the processed data and the 
performed cryptographic operations. The attacker can measure the power 
consumption by monitoring the power supply of the system while it is performing 
any cryptographic operation. This relationship, between the power consumption 
and the internal state of a cryptographic implementation, can be exploited by the 
adversary to recover the secret key. Refer to [36] for more detailed about power 
analysis attacks. 
 Electromagnetic attacks. Electromagnetic attacks are exactly the same as the 
power analysis attacks except they target the electromagnetic radiation of the 
electronic device, instead of targeting the power consumption in the power 
analysis attacks, which depends on the processed data and the performed 
cryptographic operations.   
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In practice, power analysis attacks and electromagnetic attacks are two types of 
side channel attacks, where the first one targeted the power consumption and the later one 
target the electromagnetic radiation; both have to use the same statistical techniques to 
explore some important information to obtain the secret key. So, any technique used to 
mount power analysis attacks can also be used to mount electromagnetic attacks. There 
are three types of power analysis attacks: 
1. Simple Power Analysis (SPA):  is the simplest form of power analysis attack and 
requires full understanding of the cryptographic algorithm. This type of attack 
comprises visual examination of the power traces for large scale differences from 
the cryptographic device, running operations over time. At the algorithm level, 
cryptographic devices consume different amounts of power based on the 
operation being processed. From [43] it is possible in some applications to figure 
out which instructions are executing or perhaps which processed data bits are 
being changed. If those data bits are part of the secret key, that part of the 
implementation is more vulnerable to attack. This type of attack might suffer from 
the amount of noise. 
2. Differential Power Analysis (DPA): is more complicated than the SPA. 
However, DPA is a much more robust type of attack because of the statistical 
analysis techniques it uses to perform the attack. There are two well-known 
thoroughly investigated power models currently in use (Hamming weight and the 
Hamming distance models). The basic concept of DPA exploits the hardware 
power consumption variations which represent the correlation between the power 
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consumption measurements and the manipulated data while performing 
operations using secret keys. DPA attacks use signal processing and error 
correction properties to overcome the noise problem that cannot be analyzed with 
SPA. Moreover, DPA uses the statistical analysis techniques which involve the 
evaluation of the differences between the means of power traces from multiple 
cryptographic operations to predict the secret key; for more details refer to [6] 
[43] [44] [45]. 
3. Correlation Power Analysis (CPA): is a development of DPA applies the key 
hypothesis which correlates the results (power prediction) of the power 
consumption model to the actual measured power consumption. Finally, the 
correct key hypothesis is evaluated by the highest peak of the correlation plot. 
1.7 Countermeasures against Side Channel Attacks 
Since the first introduction of side channel attacks, finding effective 
countermeasures to thwart or mitigate them has received enormous attention from the 
research community. The main idea here is to block or mitigate the information leakage. 
Since each type of attack depends on different leakage of information (power 
consumption, electromagnetic radiation, timing variations and cache profile information), 
different techniques are required to mitigate them. 
Power analysis and electromagnetic attacks countermeasures aim to break the 
correlation between any sensitive intermediate key-dependent value and the leakage 
power consumption from processing that value, during the execution of the cryptographic 
algorithm. Hiding and masking are two well-investigated solutions at the algorithmic 
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level that require applying modification to the cryptographic algorithm to reduce that 
dangerous leakage. On the other hand, based on the required security level, 
countermeasures can be applied on protocol and hardware levels [46]. In this thesis we 
focus on the algorithm level. 
 Hiding: hiding techniques make the leakage (power consumption or 
electromagnetic radiation) constant or randomized to eliminate the dependency by 
several ways including random delay [47], dummy operations and shuffling [48]. 
 Masking: masking techniques make the leakage dependent on some random 
values. Masking is the common and widely employed countermeasure to protect 
block cipher implementations against SCAs especially at the software level. In 
masking, for every execution of the algorithm, the input data and the secret key 
(sensitive intermediate variables) are obscured with fresh and randomly selected 
bits. Therefore, all the computations at the algorithm level are masked until the 
end of the last round to break the correlation between the secret key and the actual 
power consumption. The final results are unmasked to retrieve the correct results. 
 
Timing attacks countermeasures aim to eliminate the data-dependent timing 
variation of executing a cryptographic algorithm with different inputs. In other words, 
these countermeasures manipulate the cryptographic algorithm implementation to change 
the run time behavior to be independent of the secret information. Many countermeasures 
to mitigate timing attacks are investigated, especially for AES, including: 
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 Constant Time Implementation: having an implementation that consumes the 
same amount of time to process all inputs eliminates the time variation of 
processing those inputs. 
 Randomize the Execution Time: by adding irregular dummy operations, even re-
execute the same input, may consume different amounts of time. 
Cache attacks countermeasures aim to remove the relationship between the 
processed data, during the execution of the cryptographic algorithm, and the effect of 
memory access on the cache. Many countermeasures to mitigate cache attacks are 
investigated, especially for AES, including: 
 Avoiding Memory Accesses: having a lookup table free implementation (no 
lookup tables are performed). It is effective, but removing the use of any lookup 
tables will lead us to replace them with the original logical operations to perform 
the computations, which incurs a performance overhead. 
 Alternative Lookup Tables: using very small lookup tables, this will decrease the 
probability that a specific memory block will not be accessed during the 
encryption. This technique will reduce but not eliminate this type of attack, thus it 
needs to be combined with additional countermeasures.  
 Data-Oblivious Memory Access Pattern: instead of avoiding the use of  lookup 
tables one can incorporate a Data-Oblivious Memory Access Pattern technique. 
The idea is that the memory access pattern must be completely oblivious to the 
data processed through the encryption process. To perform that, one reads all 
entries of the related lookup table, in fixed order, whenever any single one is 
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needed. This technique is effective but very slow, thus secure speedup techniques 
should be applied to solve the performance problem.   
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 CHAPTER 2
An Efficient Leakage Free Countermeasure of AES 
using SIMD 
 
AES [49] has become a widely and extensively used encryption primitive in a 
large variety of applications, from high-end servers such as dedicated cryptographic 
servers to mobile consumer products. The most successfully mounted attacks on AES are 
side-channel attacks, which utilize the leakage observations resulting from processing the 
intermediate variable during the execution of the cryptographic algorithms, such as power 
consumption, electromagnetic radiation, timing variations and cache profile information 
(hit and miss rates or access tracer) to retrieve the secret keys. Great efforts have been 
made to create countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Masking is a widely used 
countermeasure to defeat differential power analysis (DPA) and differential 
electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) attacks. Having a constant-time implementation is a 
sound countermeasure to mitigate timing attacks. One way to mitigate cache attacks is by 
having an implementation that does not use lookup tables. The current solutions are 
secure against one type of attack but might be vulnerable to others, cause a serious impact 
on the performance or memory requirements, which make them impractical for real life 
applications. Keep in mind, applying the higher order masking require us to manipulate 
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the mask values by adding the masking corrections, where all the computations will be 
duplicated based on the order we used. For example, if we work on the first order (one 
mask value involved), all the computations will be duplicated, one for the masked value 
and the other for mask itself. If we work on the second order (two mask values involved), 
all the computations will be carried out three times, one for the masked value and one for 
each mask. Moreover, applying provably secure higher order masking schemes also has 
additional negative impacts on the performance such as securing the non-linear operation. 
Furthermore, removing the lookup tables to mitigate cache attacks will lead us to replace 
them with their original logical operations to compute the needed results. For example, if 
a lookup table is used to compute the multiplication operation over Galois Field GF(28), 
we have to replace it with the original logical operation as in Algorithm 1 Gmult. 
Algorithm 1 Gmult multiplication over GF(28) 
Input: a , b 
Output: p = GF8(a × b) 
1. p ← 0x00 
2. For i = 0 to 7 do  
3.      if (b & 1)                 // Check if  LSB of b=1 
4.           p ← (p a)        // p ^= a 
5.      carry ← (a&0x80) //check  if MSB = 1 
6.      a ← (a1)            // shift a left by 1 
7.      if (carry & 0x80)    // if MSB = 1 
8.           a ← (a 0x1B) // Modular reduction  
9.      b ← (b1)            // Shift right b by 1 
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Finally, achieving a constant-time implementation to defeat timing attacks 
imposes adding some dummy operations, to make sure all the input data will complete all 
the computations simultaneously. All of that will imply a negative impact on the 
performance of our countermeasure. Remarkably, we face three challenges, the security 
of AES against multiple SCAs at the same time, the performance impact and the memory 
overhead. 
2.1 Higher-order Masking of AES 
The idea behind the higher-order masking scheme is to choose d, where d is the 
order of the masking scheme, uniformly distributed and independent from any sensitive 
data random values. Then, the aim is to break the correlation between any sensitive 
intermediate value x and the leakage information from processing that value, and throw 
the computation time of the algorithm being used, by splitting x into d + 1 tuples or 
shares, satisfying a group of operations  as a relation between them. 
 
0 1 dx x x x      (1)
In (1) 1, , dx x  shares are commonly called masks and 0x is the sensitive masked 
variable. In our work the exclusive-or   is used for . Protecting a block cipher such as 
AES using higher-order masking requires modifying the design of the algorithm and 
manipulating the masked values, to ensure that applying the same group of operations on 
the final shares will extract the correct expected cipher text without masking. Taking into 
account the security property and reducing the penalty of using higher-order masking will 
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guarantee a practical implementation of a countermeasure against any SCA of order less 
than or equal to d.  
From the previous chapter, it is clear that AES comprises linear (e.g., ShiftRows, 
MixColumns, and AddRoundKey) and nonlinear (e.g., SubBytes, also known as S-box in 
the case of AES) transformations. Linear transformations are easy to mask considering: 
 
0( ) ( ) ( )df x f x f x     (2)
Thus, the linear transformations can be securely implemented independently on 
each share in a straightforward way, where ( )f   indicates any linear operation. In 
contrast to the ease of masking the linear transformations, masking the nonlinear S-box 
transformation in any block cipher is the hardest and most expensive part. 
 
Algorithm 2 SecMult dth order secure mult in F2
8 [13] 
Input: shares ai where i  ai = a, bi where i  bi = b 
Output: shares ci where i ci = ab 
1. For i = 0 to d do 
2.        For j = i+1  to d do 
3.               ri,j ← rand(128) 
4.               rj,i ← (ri,j  aibj)   ajbi 
5. For i = 0 to d do 
6.        ci ← aibi 
7.        For j = 0 to d, j≠i do 
8.               ci ← ci  ri,j    
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2.2 Provably Secure Higher-order Masking of AES S-Box (nonlinear) 
Ishai, Sahai and Wagner’s ISW scheme [50] masks Boolean AND gates combined 
with a NOT gate in any cryptographic operational circuit. The scheme requires each input 
bit to the AND gate to be split into 2d+1 shares, where d is the order of the masking 
scheme. 
Rivian and Prouff [13] generalized the ISW technique by masking the AND gate 
that represents the multiplication in GF(2), to design a provably secure dthd୲୦ order 
multiplication in GF(28) (see Algorithm 2). In addition, they reduced the number of 
required shares from 2d+2 to d+1. Furthermore, they proposed the first secure dth order 
S-box to involve the inversion over GF(28) based on the exponentiation operation. As the 
inverse x-1 of a polynomial-based representation value xGF(28) is hard to compute 
using division over GF(28), they found an addition chain that needs four secure 
multiplications of SecMult as in Algorithm 2 and seven secure squares over GF(28) to 
calculate x-1 = x254. Finally, they used a lookup tables (LUTs) approach to implement 
multiplication and squares over GF(28). 
2.3 Our Contributions 
In the work, we definitely aim for producing a countermeasure of AES against 
multiple side channel attacks at the same time with a reasonable and practical speed. We 
focus on techniques to produce an efficient leakage-free countermeasure of AES against 
power analysis, electromagnetic emissions, timing and cache attacks as well as 
techniques to improve the performance and solve the memory overhead issue. This 
countermeasure features a secure higher-order masking scheme (to defeat power and 
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electromagnetic attacks), the elimination of lookup tables (to mitigate cache attacks and 
remove memory overhead), and a constant-time implementation (to defend against timing 
attacks). However, combining these countermeasures imposes a negative impact on the 
performance.  Therefore, we apply techniques to solve the performance problem at the 
algorithm and data levels.  
2.4 Polynomial Over GF(28) 
In this section, we work on the original domain where all the calculations are 
carried out on Galois field GF(28). Based on our analysis, the higher order masking 
scheme of AES spends the most time computing the SecMult operation that calls the 
Galois field multiplication in the field GF(28), which is used in the masked S-box 
operation when we compute the inverse operation in the SubByte transformation and 
when we multiply in the field GF(28) by (02) and (03) in the MixColumn transformation. 
To solve the performance problem without losing the SCA immunity, we applied 
improvements in two levels: 
1- Algorithmic level: Combine some fast, short and provably high order 
secure techniques against three types of SCA. 
2- Data level: Take the advantage of SIMD technology. Here we process 16 
bytes at the same time, rather than one by one, and we will pay some penalty to make that 
work using the existing SSSE3 instructions. 
Higher-order masking of AES involves two types of operation, as mentioned 
earlier: linear and nonlinear. The linear operations are easy to mask. The nonlinear 
operation (e.g., SecMult over GF(28)) is the most expensive operation to evaluate in the 
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whole cipher. Thus, increasing the speed of the higher-order masking scheme relies on 
decreasing the time take to evaluate the S-box transformation. 
2.4.1 Algorithmic Level 
A. Secure S-box (SecSbox) 
We need to reduce the instances of using the secure multiplication (SecMult) 
function as much as possible. We chose the dth order SecSbox operation based on the 
exponentiation operation that was proposed by Rivain and Prouff in [13]. They found an 
efficient addition-chain that minimizes the number of SecMult and uses a secure square 
(SecSquare) operation as follows: 
 
2 3 1 2 1 5 2 4 0 2 5 2 2 5 4x x x x x x x x        (3) 
In the above chain, we have seven squares and four multiplication operations [13]. 
The SecSquare is fast because it is linear and needs a less number of multiplications in 
Galois field than the normal SecMult.  
B. MixColumn: 
In the MixColumn transformation we need to multiply by (02) and by (03) in F28. 
However, keep in mind that the identity in (4) can help us to reduce the number of 
SecMult function usage. Therefore, instead of multiplying x by (02) and then by (03) we 
can multiply x by (02) then XOR- the addition operation in F2
8- the result with x again to 
get the x multiply by (03) as follows: 
 (03) {(02) }x x x     (4) 
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2.4.2 Parallel Computation using SIMD technology 
In Intel machines, SSSE3 instruction set comprises a special type of instructions 
that permit programmers to take advantage of data-level parallelism, using a single 
instruction to manipulate multiple data simultaneously. The new independent XMM 
register set is used to execute such instructions; each XMM register is a 128-bit length, 
which allows programmers to process sixteen bytes (eight bits each) at the same time. 
Using SIMD technology ensures the number of CPU clock cycles (running time) is 
reduced and the power consumption of any program is appropriate for data level 
parallelism. In this proposed technique, we will employ the SIMD technology in all the 
functions to take advantage of data level parallelism as shown in Figure 6, specifically 
SecMult, which is the non-linear function. One of the challenges is how to manipulate 
each byte without affecting the other byte next to it in the same XMM register.  For 
example, when we do the shift left in the GF(28) multiplication function, we do not want 
any shifted byte to affect the byte next to it. 
Fortunately, the state matrix consists of 16 bytes (8 bit each); in this case, we can 
fit all of the state matrix bytes in one XMM register. Then depending on the order, we 
will have mask values in front of each state matrix element. For example, if d = 1 we will 
have one mask for each element which means 16 mask values that can be fit in another 
XMM register to perform the mask correction in parallel whenever we need. 
In our technique, to perform an AES dth order masking computation, we will 
assume passing the d+1 shares of the masked secret key to the algorithm as an input (to 
mitigate first order attacks). It is also worth, at this point, to divide the operations in the 
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AES masking scheme into linear and nonlinear operations. The linear operations include 
AddRoundKey, ShiftRows, MixColumn, SecSquare, and AffineTransformation. Linear 
operations are easier to mask and can be performed on each share separately. The only 
nonlinear operation, on the other hand, is the SecMult function, which is the most 
expensive function and can be masked using Algorithm 2. 
A. Parallelize Galois field (28) Multiplication using SIMD  
The multiplication function (Gmult) performs multiplication over GF(28) of two 
128 bit XMM register each contains 16 bytes (8 bit each). This function multiplies each 
byte in the first XMM register by the byte in the same position of the second XMM 
register. To perform this multiplication, we recall Shift-and-Add method that was 
proposed in [51] to calculate the multiplication in polynomial over GF(28) and then 
manipulate it to be applicable to work on XMM registers. 
Here a (the Multiplicand) and b (the Multiplier) are the two inputs to be 
multiplied. The order does not matter since we will get the same result. To perform the 
binary multiplication, we need to scan and test each bit of the multiplier right to left. 
Then, depending on whether the bit is 1 or 0, we will add the multiplicand to the product 
(p) or not. After each test, we have to shift the multiplicand left by one and shift the 
multiplier right by 1. The result will be stored in p. The function can be described with 
pseudo codes as in Algorithm 1. 
In order to perform the multiplication function on XMM registers, we have to 
make sure that none of the bytes will affect the one next to it, especially when we do the 
shift left or right operations. Therefore, we used "paddb" to perform the shift left 
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operation for the 16 bytes in parallel (Line 6). Also, we shift left the mask of b instead of 
shift b right (Line 9) because shift right in SIMD is expensive. Another concern, is how 
to check the LSB (Least significant bit) to perform (p ^= a) (Line 4) and MSB (Most 
significant bit) of each byte to detect if the carry is about to be generated and then apply 
the reduction by XOR with (0x1B) (Line 8), thus we do not expand the number of bits 
more than 8 bits for each byte. This issue has been resolved by using the "pcmpeqb" 
instruction, which performs the parallel comparison (Lines 3 and 7). 
B. Parallelize the Remaining Linear Operations using SIMD 
AddRoundKey is implemented using one “pxor” instruction that performs sixteen 
parallel XOR operations. 
ShiftRows is a function where we do not shift the first row but we shift the 
second, third and fourth by 1, 2, 3 bytes, respectively. Thus, it is constructed using one 
“pshufb” instruction with Mask = (0x03020100, 0x06050407, 0x09080b0a, 0x0c0f0e0d). 
MixColumns In this function we multiply (over Galois field F2
8) each column of 
four bytes with a constant matrix as in (5). 
'
0, 0,
'
1, 1,
'
2, 2,
'
3, 3,
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 2
3 1 1 3
i i
i i
i i
i i
S S
S S
S S
S S
                               
 (5) 
Multiplication by (02) is a special case of Algorithm 1, it is simply a shift left and 
a conditional XOR that can be implemented as a separate function Gmult_by2 because it 
will take smaller time than the normal Gmult (Algorithm 1) function. The later one will 
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do the shift 8 times. However, Gmult_by2 needs only one shift and then check if we have 
to perform the reduction (by XOR with 0x1B) or not. Therefore, one “paddb” instruction 
is used to perform the parallel shift left operation and one “pxor” instruction is used for 
the modular reduction if needed, based on the decision of the “pcmpeqb” instruction. 
Multiplication by (03) is achieved by XORing (using one “pxor” instruction) the multiple 
by (02) with the original value. 
Let us consider a single column of the state and apply the MixColumn 
transformation on it. We will get: 
   
   
   
   
'
0, 0, 1, 2, 3,
'
1, 0, 1, 2, 3,
'
2, 0, 1, 2, 3,
'
3, 0, 1, 2, 3,
2 . 3 .
2 . 3 .
2 . 3 .
3 . 2 .
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
S S S S S
S S S S S
S S S S S
S S S S S
   
   
   
   
 (6) 
Now, let us rewrite the single column of the state as shown in (6) and apply the 
MixColumn transformation on it taking into our accounts that by applying the above 
identity (4) we will get: 
    
    
    
    
'
0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3,
'
1, 0, 1, 2, 2, 3,
'
2, 0, 1, 2, 3, 3,
'
3, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3,
2 . 2 .
2 . 2 .
2 . 2 .
2 . 2 .
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
S S S S S S
S S S S S S
S S S S S S
S S S S S S
    
    
    
    
 (7) 
Accordingly, we will form the final equations to implement the MixColumn the 
16 bytes of the state in parallel as follows: 
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0 1, 0, 0, 0,
1 2, 2, 1, 1,
2 3, 3, 3, 2,
3 0, 1, 2, 0,
4 1, 2, 3, 3,
2
2
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
y S S S S
y S S S S
y S S S S
y S S S S
y S S S S
   
   
   
     
     
 
'
0 1 2 3 4MixS y y y y y      
(8) 
Thus, we need 5 "pshufd" instructions to do the reordering and then four "pxor" to 
get the final result. 
AffineTransformation is performed after the multiplicative inverse operation to 
complete the S-box transformation. It is the sum (XOR operation) of four rotations of the 
byte as a vector. Suppose that we got the result of one byte from the Multiplicative 
Inverse in a variable x = [x0,x1,…,x7] where x0,…,x7 are bits, to implement the affine 
transformation we need to follow Algorithm 3. 
Algorithm 3 Affine_Trans: affine transformation 
Input: x 
Output: c = affine transformation of (x) 
1. y = x. 
2. For i = 0 to 3 do 
3.        x ← x {rotate_left(y) by one bit} 
4.  c ← x 0x63 
Thus, we do not have to check if it is even or not to avoid conditional branches in 
order to ensure a constant operation flow [13]. To securely apply the masking scheme on 
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this linear function, each share can be transformed independently except XOR with 0x63 
in (line 4), that need to be XORed with one share only. 
2.4.3 Masking the Parallelize operations 
From the previous section, we succeed in applying the SIMD technology on all 
the AES operations to archive data level parallelism. Accordingly, now our solution can 
perform sixteen parallel computations simultaneously instead of one by one. Now the 
next step is to mask those computations to secure them. As mentioned in Section 2.1, 
AES comprises linear and non-linear operations. The linear operations are easy to mask 
considering (2), where applying the operation on each share separately is secure in the 
higher order masking scheme. For example, masking the field squaring (SecSquare), 
where we securely compute the square of the state shares, is accomplished by square 
every share separately by multiply the share by itself as shown in Algorithm 4. Thus, it 
requires (d+1) calls to Gmult function in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 4 SecSquare - dth-order secure square over F2
8 
Input: shares ai satisfying i ai = a 
Output: shares ci satisfying i  ci = a2 
1. For i = 0 to d do 
2.        ci ← (ai)
2 
However, masking the non-linear operation is the critical and most expensive part 
of the whole algorithm. For example, masking the field multiplication (SecMult), where 
our technique adapts the same SecMult function that was proposed in [13], which uses 
Ishai-Sahai-Wagner (ISW) scheme. Except that we do the multiplication using our Gmult 
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(Algorithm 1) function instead of using the look-up tables (LUTs) approach. Thus, 
Algorithm 2 needs (d+1)2 calls to Gmult (Algorithm 1) function, 2d(d+1) XORs and d 
(d+1)/2 random 128-bit values to be generated.  
From the two examples above, it is obvious that the linear operations are easier to 
mask compared with the non-linear operation. 
2.5 Security Analysis 
The overall security of our implementation can be easily proved using the proofs 
in [13]. Moreover, we believe that we solved the differential power and electromagnetic 
analysis (by applying the high order masking scheme), the timing attack (by achieving a 
constant-time implementation as a result of using SIMD technology), and the cache-
attack (by avoiding the use of any look-up tables). 
2.6 Implementation Results 
To achieve the best optimization, we implemented our scheme (higher-order 
masking of AES) by leveraging SSSE3 instructions with C-language in Linux machine 
with SSSE3 support. Moreover, using inline assembly code gave us the best performance. 
We assumed the availability of (an inaccessible to attackers) a pool of independent and 
uniformly distributed random masks. We compared the implementations of our scheme 
with two different implementations [13] [52] interims of the first, second and third order. 
In [13], they implemented their scheme and used log/ alog table to improve the efficiency 
of the multiplication over F2
8 which is the most costly function. In [52], they did the 
exponentiation operation over the composite field F2
4 to get better performance and they 
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used six lookup tables to speed up the squaring, two squaring, squaring-scalar 
multiplication, multiplication, isomorphism and inverse isomorphism operations.  In our 
implementation, we masked the entire rounds and we do not use any lookup tables. 
However, we gain a speedup of 9.5, 9.3 and 7.6 times faster than the existing 
countermeasure in [13] for first, second and third order masking. Also, we gain a speedup 
of 1.1, 6.8 and 5.6 times faster than the existing countermeasure in [52] for first, second 
and third order masking as listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Comparing Encryption Execution Time and Size of Lookup Tables with 
Other Schemes 
Scheme 
Cycles (×103cc) Table size(Bytes) Times 
Encryption LUT Speedup 
Original AES (Straightforward AES) 
[52] 9.0 255  
First Order Masking 
[13] 129 3153 9.56 
[52] 14.9 256 1.1 
Ours 13.5 0  
Second Order Masking 
[13] 271 3845 9.34 
[52] 199.3 816 6.87 
Ours 29 0  
Third Order Masking 
[13] 470 4648 7.62 
[52] 346.8 816 5.62 
Ours 61.7 0  
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 CHAPTER 3
Efficient SubByte Transformation (S-box) 
 
Again higher-order masking of AES involves two types of operation, as 
mentioned earlier: linear and nonlinear. The linear operations are easy to mask. The 
nonlinear operation (e.g., SecMult) is the most expensive operation to evaluate in the 
whole cipher. Furthermore, SecMult is one of many functions in which evaluating the 
AES S-box has to perform. Thus, increasing the speed of the higher-order masking 
scheme relies on decreasing the time take to evaluate the SubByte (known also as S-box) 
transformation. Thus, this chapter focuses on incorporate some techniques to accelerate 
the bottleneck transformation of the whole AES the SubByte transformation, which 
involves two major operations; the inversion and the affine transformation, aiming to 
achieve better performance when applying the Higher-order masking scheme. Optimizing 
the S-box using composite field has been proposed in [53]. 
3.1 Our Contributions 
Our objective is to increase the performance of the bottleneck transformation 
(SubByte transformation) with the same level of security by apply enhancement 
techniques in three different levels: 
1. Algorithm level: Combine some fast and provably high order secure algorithms. 
To achieve that we will transform all the S-box computations from GF(28) to map 
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x to GF(24), where the inverse is evaluated using the power function x1→ x254 
over GF(28) as in (3), while in GF(24) using the power function x1→ x14 as in (11) 
map x to GF(24). More over each element in GF(24) is represented by 4-bits 
compared with 8-bits in GF(28), which means the Galois field multiplication will 
coast us have of the time in GF(24) that in GF(28) as a result of reducing the 
number of iterations from 8 as in Algorithm 1 to 4 as in Algorithm 5.  
2. Byte level: Take advantage of the parallel computing by using Single Instruction 
Multiple Data (SIMD) technology (SSSE3 instructions). 
3. Bit level: Driving the formulas for each bit if (applicable). 
8 4 2: (2 ) ((2 ) )GF GF   
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

              
 
(9) 
3.2 Inversion Operation Over Composite Field GF(24) 
In this section, we work on the extension field (composite field) domain where all 
the calculations are carried out over GF(24). The idea is to transform each element in the 
finite field GF(28) to the finite field GF((24)2) because the finite field GF(28) is 
isomorphic to the finite field GF((24)2). In other words, there exists only one element in 
GF((24)2) for each element in GF(28). This transformation from any element a   GF(28) 
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to a two-term polynomial ahx + al where ah and al   GF(24) or vice versa is achieved by 
multiplying with the isomorphism functions in (9) and (10). 
1 4 2 8: ((2 ) ) (2 )GF GF    
1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
 
              
 
(10) 
Figure 7 shows the inverse operation that is the first step in the AES S-box 
operations over the composite field. The affine transformation is then applied to complete 
the S-box computation. For more details refer to [53]. 
To perform the inverse operation over the composite field shown in Figure 7 we 
have to execute the following steps: 
Step1. Map x to GF(24)MapxtoGF(2ସ) by multiplying x by to perform ha  and al   
GF(24). 
Step2. Produce 2 ( )h l h ld a a a a    GF(24).  
Step3. Compute the inverse 1'd d    GF(24) using the exponentiation operation. 
Step4. Extract ' 'h ha d a , ' 'l la d a  GF(24). 
Step5. Map-1 ' ',( )h la a to GF(2
8) by multiplying ' ',( )h la a  by  to perform x-1  GF(28). 
We can securely mask all the linear functions from step 1 to step 5 (mapping , 
, squaring, adding  and scalar multiplication by  by applying the operation on each 
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share independently, contrary to the linear operation (multiplication over 
GF(24)MapxtoGF(2ସ)) which must follow Algorithm 2. In step 3, the inversion over 
GF(24)MapxtoGF(2ସ) is evaluated using the addition chain in (11) that was proposed in 
[52]: 
S M 2S M
1 2 3 12 14x x x x x     (11) 
This chain contains a series of linear operations (single square (S) and double 
square (2S)) and two nonlinear operations (multiplication (M)). All squares and 
multiplications are over GF(24)MapxtoGF(2ସ). In [52] the authors implemented the 
masking using six precomputed lookup tables to enhance the computation speed of 
squaring, two squaring, squaring-scalar multiplication, multiplication, isomorphism and 
inverse isomorphism functions. That is exactly what we would like to avoid, in order 
mitigating cache attacks (our technique does not use any lookup tables). 
3.3 Parallelize Galois field (24) Multiplication using SIMD  
As stated earlier, the AES block comprises of 16 bytes. We desire to reach data-level 
parallelism by design the Gmult function, which can perform sixteen multiplications over 
GF(24) simultaneously. Galois field multiplication over GF(24) involves multiplication of 
two polynomials a(x) and b(x)GF(24) and modular reduction of the product with m(x) = 
Figure 7: Inverse operation over composite field [41] 
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x4 + x + 1GF(24). We designed the Gmult function, which requires two parameters of 
type _m128i that can be held in two 128 bit XMM registers each containing 16 bytes (8 
bits each), and returns the result of the multiplication in a 16 bytes XMM register 
following Algorithm 5. 
Algorithm 5 Gmult multiplication over GF(24) 
Input: a, b   GF(24) 
Output: p = GF4(a×b) 
1. p ← 0x00 
2. For i = 0 to 3 do  
3.      if (b & 1)                  
4.           p ← (pa)          
5.      carry ← (a&0x80)  
6.      a ← (a1)             
7.      if (carry & 0x80)     
8.           a ← (a0x13)   
9.      b ← (b1)             
 
Algorithm 5 explains how to evaluate a multiplication in GF(24). First, reset the 
product p = 0 by XORing p with itself using the “pxor” instruction, which performs 
sixteen parallel XOR operations (Line 1). Then, from right to left examine the least 
significant bit (LSB) in b with the help of the parallel compare “pcmpeqb” instruction 
(Line 3). Next, for each non-zero bit, add a to the product (Line 4). Detect if the carry is 
about to be generated (Line 5), as a result of shifting a left, through the parallel AND 
bytes “pand” instruction; this step will detect any byte in which the most significant bit 
(MSB) equals one. Next, a is doubled. Shift a left by one bit via the parallel add bytes 
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“paddb” instruction that performs the parallel shift left operation (Line 6). The 
“pcmpeqb” instruction is used once more to produce the masks to perform the conditional 
operations (Line 7). The results of the “pcmpeqb” instruction (Lines 3 and 7), either 0xFF 
or ox00, are used as masks to decide whether or not to perform the operations in line 4 
and 8. A modular reduction is performed (Line 8) by XORing a with m(x). Finally, b is 
shifted right by one bit, which is costly to implement using SSSE3 instructions; instead, 
we shift the mask of b to the left using “paddb” instruction (Line 9). 
3.4 Parallel and Masked Inversion over Composite Field  
As mentioned above, the inversion over a composite field comprises two different 
types of operations, linear and nonlinear. All the operations should satisfy the provably 
secure higher-order security conditions. We design our dth order masked inversion over a 
composite field that fulfils these requirements. First, we divide the inversion operations in 
Figure 7 into seven steps, as shown in Figure 8. 
In Figure 8, we classify the linear (steps 1, 2a, 2b, 4 and 7) and nonlinear (steps 3, 
5 and 6) operations. It is straightforward to secure the linear operations by applying the 
operation on each tuple separately because they satisfy (2). Iimplementing step 1, which 
maps any polynomial element from GF(28) to the two-term polynomial h la x a where ah 
Figure 8: Parallel and masked inverse operation over composite field 
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and al   GF(24) and vice versa (step 7) mapping back in a secure masked way, is 
accomplished by multiplying by and respectively for each share independently. 
Masking the XOR operation (i.e., steps 2b and 4) is achieved using the “pxor” 
instruction for each share separately.  
For further enhancements, we combine some of the linear operations in one 
function to reduce the execution time. For instance step 2(a) in Figure 8, (x2) is a 
combination of two functions, squaring and multiplication by lambda.  
Masking the squaring with multiplication by lambda (x2), which is also a linear 
operation, can be performed on each share independently. 
For masking the field multiplication over GF(24) multiplication is the critical and 
most expensive part of the whole cipher; the nonlinear operation. We recall the SecMult4 
function that was proposed in [52], which follows Algorithm 2, except that we use our 
Gmult function (Algorithm 5) instead of using the LUT approach. 
Masking the inversion over GF(24) (step 5) requires raising each element to the 
power 14 as described in (11). To design this function, three different operations are 
used: squaring, double squaring (raising to the power 4) and multiplication. Both the 
square and double square functions are linear. Therefore, it is straightforward to mask 
them by performing the function on each share individually. 
3.5 Deriving Formulas  
 In this section, rather than performing the square in the polynomial representation 
using the Gmult function as in Algorithm 5, which contains four iterations of checking 
the least significant bit (LSB) to Xor with the result variable, check if the carry is about to 
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be generated by checking the most significant bit (MSB) to apply the modular reduction 
with m(x) = x4 + x + 1GF(24), shift ܽ to the left and shift ܾ to the right operations, we 
will utilize a Karnaugh map to drive the formulas for each bit. A Karnaugh map is a 
special mechanism, using Gray code to make adjacent, bit patterns that differ in one bit 
position, to lower the required extensive calculations by taking advantage of humans' 
pattern-recognition capability. This mechanism has been adopted to reduce the amount of 
required calculations to perform the square operation [54]. The idea is to perform all the 
computations to do the squaring on all possible inputs as in Table 2. Then, applying a 
Karnaugh map on each column (see Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 12, and Figure 12) of the 
final truth table to get the sum-of-products terms (known as minterms) as in (12).   
' '
' '
( , , , )
( , , , )
( , , , )
( , , , )
A
B
C
D
S
S
S
S
f A B C D A
f A B C D AC AC
f A B C D B
f A B C D BD B D

 

 
 (12) 
After that, simplify the resulting minterms using Boolean algebra by making use 
of relationships and theorems such as grouping, multiplication by redundant variables, 
DeMorgan's Theorem, etc., to get the final results as shown in (13). 
' '
' '
( , , , )
( , , , )
( , , , )
( , , , )
A
B
C
D
S
S
S
S
f A B C D A
f A B C D AC AC A C
f A B C D B
f A B C D BD B D B D

   

   
 (13) 
Finally, the square operation, which is a special case of multiplication, can be 
performed in any element over GF(24) using (14): 
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 2( ) ( ) modq x a x ( )m x   
where 4( ), ( ) (2 )q x a x GF   (14) 
0 0 2
2 1 3
q a a
q a a
 
  , 
1 2
3 3
q a
q a

  
Table 2: Squaring Truth Table 
xd 
x Square(x) 
A B C D SA SB SC SD 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
5 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
6 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
7 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
8 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
10 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
11 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
12 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
13 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
14 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
15 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
 a3 a2 a1 a0 a3 a3 a1 a2 a2 a0 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Karnaugh map for SA in Table 2 
Figure 9: Karnaugh map for SB in Table 2 
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Figure 12: Karnaugh map for SC in Table 2 
Figure 12: Karnaugh map for SD in Table 2 
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Moreover, using the same technique multiplication by lambda can be performed 
in any element over GF(24) by: 
 ( ) ( ) modq x a x    ( )m x  
where 0xe    (15) 
0 1 2 3,q a a a    1 0 1q a a   
2 0 1 2 ,q a a a    3 0 1 2 3q a a a a     
Substitute the equations from (14) in (15): 
0 2 1 3 3q a a a a     
1 0 2 2q a a a    
2 0 2 2 1 3q a a a a a      
3 0 2 2 1 3 3q a a a a a a       
Finally, squaring and multiplication by lambda can be performed as one function 
(x2) in any element over GF(24) by: 
 2( ) ( ) modq x a x   ( )m x  
where 0xe    (16) 
0 1 2 ,q a a   1 0q a  
2 0 1 3,q a a a    3 0 1q a a   
The double square function can be implemented instead of calling the square 
twice, via combining the square with itself mod m(x). Hence, the double square function 
is implemented by substituting the equations from (14) in (14) again: 
0 0 2 1 3
1 1 3
2 2 3
3 3
q a a a a
q a a
q a a
q a
   
 
 

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Thus, the double square (x4) can be performed in any element over GF(24) by: 
 4( ) ( ) modq x a x ( )m x  
where 4( ), ( ) (2 )q x a x GF   (17) 
0 0 1 2 3,q a a a a     1 1 3q a a   
2 2 3 ,q a a   3 3q a  
3.6 Affine Transformation  
 AffineTransformation is performed after the multiplicative inverse operation to 
complete the S-box transformation by multiplying with the affine transformation (AT) 
matrix as in (18). Then, XORing with the 0x63 hexadecimal value. 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
AT
              
 
(18) 
For more enhancements, we merged the isomorphism functions  in (10) with 
the affine transformation (AT) matrix in (18) to compose a new matrix that performs both 
operations in the cost of one only (+AF) as in (19). Therefore, by multiplying the 
outcome from the multiplicative inverse with this matrix, then XORing the result using 
the “pxor” instruction with 0x63 with one of the shares only in the case of dth order 
masking, we complete the S-box transformation. 
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1
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
AT 
               
 (19) 
3.7 Security Analysis 
 From [52], the security of our technique can be easily proven. Furthermore, we 
believe that our countermeasure can prevent power analysis, electromagnetic, timing and 
cache attacks because we apply the higher-order masking scheme, achieving a constant-
time implementation (through using SSSE3 instructions) and avoid the use of any lookup 
tables. 
3.8 Implementation Results 
We implement this efficient higher-order masking of AES S-box by incorporating 
SSSE3 instructions with C-language. Rather than using the intrinsic functions that are 
easier to deal with, we chose inline assembly code for better performance. We replaced 
the S-box that was used in  CHAPTER 2. After that, we compared our implementation 
with two different implementations in [13] and [52]. In [13], a higher-order masking 
scheme was implemented using a log table to improve the efficiency of the multiplication 
over GF(28). In [52], the exponentiation operation was done over the composite field 
GF(24) for better performance and six lookup tables were used to speed up six operations 
as mentioned above.  
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In our technique the S-box is computed over the composite field GF(24) and no 
lookup tables are used. However, as shown in Table 3, we gain a speedup of 12.77, 13.48 
and 10.11 times faster than the existing countermeasure in [13] for first, second and third 
order masking, respectively. Speedup is 1.5, 9.9 and 7.5 times faster than the existing 
countermeasure in [52] for first, second and third order masking. 
Table 3. Comparing Encryption Execution Time and Size of Lookup Tables with 
Other Schemes 
Scheme 
Cycles (×103cc) Table size(Bytes) Times 
Encryption LUT Speedup 
Original AES (Straightforward AES) 
[52] 9.0 255  
First Order Masking 
[13] 129 3153 12.77 
[52] 14.9 256 1.48 
Ours 10.1 0  
Second Order Masking 
[13] 271 3845 13.48 
[52] 199.3 816 9.91 
Ours 20.1 0  
Third Order Masking 
[13] 470 4648 10.11 
[52] 346.8 816 7.46 
Ours 46.5 0  
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 CHAPTER 4
Efficient Multiplicative Inverse  
 
Masking is a widely employed countermeasure to protect block cipher 
implementations against SCAs especially at the software level. In masking, for every 
execution of the algorithm, the input data and the secret key (sensitive intermediate 
variables) are obscured with fresh and randomly selected bits. Therefore, all the 
computations at the algorithm level are masked until the end of the last round to break the 
correlation between the secret key and the actual power consumption. As mentioned 
earlier, the bottleneck transformation of the whole AES, the S-box transformation, which 
involves two major operations, the inversion and the affine transformation, is the focus of 
any research to increase the speed of the higher-order masking scheme. As in (3), the 
efficient addition-chain that minimizes the number of SecMult and uses SecSquare 
instead carries out seven SecSquare and four SecMult. In the previous two chapters we 
spent a good amount of effort enhancing the whole cipher including the SecMult. Thus, 
this chapter focuses on incorporating some techniques to accelerate the SecSquare 
operation, which is used seven times to evaluate the multiplicative inverse operation that 
is the heart of the S-box transformation, aiming to achieve better performance when 
applying the Higher-order masking scheme. Furthermore, this chapter consolidates this 
new technique to use secure lookup tables that are efficient against cache attacks instead 
of avoiding the use of lookup tables.  
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4.1 Our Contributions 
Our objective is to increase the performance of the first operation in the 
bottleneck transformation (S-box transformation), the multiplicative inverse operation, 
with the same level of security by: 
1. Utilize the squaring property of normal basis [55]. 
2. Solving the basis conversion problem and lowering the required extensive 
calculations using Karnaugh maps [54] and Boolean algebra. 
3. Utilizing SIMD technology, which can manipulate 16 bytes concurrently, to 
achieve data level parallelism [56]. 
4. Taking advantage of the "pshufb" instruction, which performs Data-Oblivious 
Memory Access Pattern technique, to design enhanced countermeasures against 
cache attacks, instead of avoiding the use of Lookup Tables. 
4.2 Finite Field GF(28) and Normal Basis 
Understanding finite field arithmetic leads to a significant enhancement in 
implementing cryptographic operations. Conventionally, GF(2m) arithmetic is classified 
based on the element basis representation of the finite field. There are two popular bases 
commonly used in representing finite field elements to implement cryptographic 
operations; polynomial and normal bases with special mathematical characteristics. 
The polynomial basis representation of the finite field GF(28) is a basis of form 
{1, ݔ, ݔଶ, ⋯ , ݔ଻}, where the field element ܽ଻ݔ଻ + ܽ଺ݔ଺ +  ⋯ +  ܽଵݔ +  ܽ଴ is indicated by 
the coefficient bit string (ܽ଻ܽ଺ ⋯ ܽଵܽ଴) of length 8, with particular addition and 
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multiplication rules. In fact, polynomial basis representation performs the binary carry-
less multiplication efficiently. 
The normal basis representation of the finite field GF(28) is a basis of form 
{ߚ, ߚଶ
భ
, ߚଶ
మ
, ⋯ , ߚଶ
ళ
} where the transformation of the basis elements is defined by 
applying the 7th power mapping. Thus, given any element ܣ ∈ ܩܨ(2଼) then applying: 
 
ܣ =  ෍ ܽ௜ߚଶ
೔
଻
௜ୀ଴
 , ݓℎ݁ݎ݁ ܽ௜ ∈ {0,1} (20) 
The field element ܣ is indicated by the coefficient bit string (ܽ଻ܽ଺ ⋯ ܽଵܽ଴) of 
length 8, with particular addition and multiplication rules. In fact, the normal basis 
representation performs the squaring efficiently while the multiplication is more complex 
than in the polynomial basis representation. For more details refer to [55]. 
4.3 Incorporate Normal Basis Squaring Feature 
In this section, we explain our technique to reduce the cost of the provably secure 
higher-order masking of AES. As mentioned previously, most of the computation time of 
the higher order masking of AES is consumed in evaluating the S-box transformation that 
consists of two operations: the multiplicative inverse in Galois field GF(28) followed by 
the affine transformation. The latter  is just a matrix multiplication. Therefore, we will 
focus on the multiplicative inverse that contains a series of squares and multiplications 
performed in a specific order based on the addition chain as in (3), that has the least 
number of multiplication and square operations. This chain has seven SecSquare and four 
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SecMult. Each SecSquare based on (2), which is a linear operation, contains (d+1) calls 
to the Gmult function Algorithm 1. 
Thus, all of that will develop a performance problem, which is our goal to solve in 
this paper, without losing the security property, by working at three levels: 
1- Algorithm level: utilizing the efficient squaring property of the normal basis 
representation [55] of the element where the square is just a cyclic shift left. 
2- Byte level: utilizing Intel Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) technology to 
achieve data-level parallelism [56]. 
3- Bit level: Deriving the formulas for each bit using Karnaugh maps and Boolean 
algebra [54].  
In this approach, rather than performing the square in the polynomial 
representation using the Gmult function as in Algorithm 1, which contains eight iterations 
of checking the least significant bit (LSB) to Xor with the result variable, check if the 
carry is about to be generated by checking the most significant bit (MSB) to apply the 
modular reduction with m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, shift ܽ to the left and shift ܾ to the 
right operations, we will perform the squaring in the normal basis representation. As 
mentioned before, the normal basis representation is an alternative representation to the 
polynomial basis where the square is more efficient, the square in normal basis 
representation is just a cyclic shift left as shown in Algorithm 6, while the multiplication 
is more complex. Therefore, we decided to do the multiplication in the polynomial basis 
and the squaring in the normal basis. In order to do that, one must convert each share 
from polynomial basis to normal basis. In the normal basis, we perform the square. Next, 
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we transform that result to polynomial basis (which is the original representation) to 
complete any other computations. Accordingly, efficient basis conversion has become of 
interest. 
4.4 Basis Conversion 
In AES all the operations are performed in Galois field GF(28). Therefore, the 
goal is to find the fastest way to compute the representation of that element in the normal 
basis given its representation in polynomial basis. In order to do that, we chose the root 
ߚ = ݔଷଶto compute the rest of the roots൫ߚ, ߚଶ, ߚଶ
మ
, … , ߚଶ
ళ
൯. Then, given any element ܽ 
in polynomial basis representation GF(28), the normal basis (NB) representation ܾ of that 
element can be computed using (20). Subsequently, we derived the table of all elements 
from 0x00 to 0xFF to calculate all the normal basis elements. Then, we applied a 
Karnaugh map of 8-variables and Boolean algebra on each bit to find the simplified 
equation of that element that will map the polynomial representation to the normal 
representation, which resulted in: 
 ܾ଴ = ܽହ + ܽସ + ܽଶ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
ܾଵ = ܽସ + ܽଶ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
ܾଶ = ܽସ + ܽଷ + ܽଶ + ܽ଴ 
ܾଷ = ܽ଺ + ܽସ + ܽଷ + ܽ଴ 
ܾସ = ܽ଺ + ܽଷ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
ܾହ = ܽ଻ + ܽ଺ + ܽଶ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
ܾ଺ = ܽସ + ܽଷ + ܽଶ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
ܾ଻ = ܽ଺ + ܽସ + ܽଶ + ܽଵ + ܽ଴ 
(21) 
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After figuring out the needed equations to convert from polynomial basis 
representation to normal basis representation, we needed to find the fastest way to 
compute the reverse direction from normal basis representation to polynomial basis 
representation given its representation in normal basis. Our way to do that is by 
reordering the table that we got from converting the polynomial to normal based on the 
normal basis. Then, we applied a Karnaugh map of 8-variables and Boolean algebra on 
each bit to find the simplified equation of that element that will map the normal 
representation to the polynomial representation, which resulted in: 
 ܽ଴ = ܾ଻ + ܾସ + ܾଶ 
ܽଵ = ܾ଺ + ܾଶ 
ܽଶ = ܾ଻ + ܾଷ + ܾଶ + ܾଵ 
ܽଷ = ܾ଺ + ܾଵ 
ܽସ = ܾ଺ + ܾସ + ܾଷ + ܾଶ 
ܽହ = ܾଵ + ܾ଴ 
ܽ଺ = ܾ଻ + ܾଵ 
ܽ଻ = ܾ଻ + ܾ଺ + ܾହ + ܾସ + ܾଷ + ܾଶ 
(22) 
A Karnaugh map is a special mechanism, using Gray code to make adjacent, bit 
patterns that differ in one bit position, to lower the required extensive calculations by 
taking advantage of humans' pattern-recognition capability. This mechanism has been 
adopted to reduce the amount of required calculations to perform the basis conversion 
[54]. The idea is to perform all the computations to do the transformations on all possible 
inputs. Then, applying a Karnaugh map on each column of the final truth table to get the 
sum-of-products terms (known as minterms).  After that, simplify the resulting minterms 
using Boolean algebra by making use of relationships and theorems such as grouping, 
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multiplication by redundant variables, DeMorgan's Theorem, etc., to get the final results 
as shown in (21) and (22). 
4.5 Efficient Normal Basis Squaring 
As mentioned before the square operation in normal basis is just a cyclic shift left 
as shown in Algorithm 6: 
Algorithm 6: Normal basis squaring GF(28) 
Input: a   normal basis GF(28)  
Output: p = (a2) 
1. b ← a 
2. a ← (a ≪1) 
3. b ← (b≫7)                  
4. p ← (a b)          
Designing Algorithm 6 with SIMD technology is achieved with the following 
assembly code after assuming that XMM 1 holds the converted share in the normal basis 
representation: 
"movdqa  xmm1, xmm2;"   // xmm2 <- xmm1  
"psrlw      $7      , xmm2;"   // shift right by 7 word wise  
"pand       xmm8, xmm2;"   // and with 01 to get the low bit only 
"paddb     xmm1, xmm1;"   // shift left by 1 byte wise 
"pxor       xmm2, xmm1;" 
Algorithm 6 explains how to perform squaring in normal basis representation of 
GF(28). First, copy the content of ܽ to ܾ using the "movdqa" instruction, which copies 
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sixteen bytes in parallel (Line 1). Then, Shift ܽ left by one bit with the parallel add bytes 
"paddb" instruction that shifts all the sixteen bytes to the left concurrently (Line 2).  Next, 
shift ܾ right by 7 bits, but the bit-wise shift right operation is not supported in the existing 
instruction set. Therefore, we used the "psrlw" instruction to perform the shift right 
operation for the 16 bytes simultaneously followed by AND with the hexadecimal value 
0x01 to get just the MSB through the parallel AND bytes "pand" instruction (Line 3). 
Finally, the result of the rotate left operation is accomplished in line (Line 4) by XORing 
ܽ with ܾ using the "pxor" instruction, which performs sixteen simultaneous XOR 
operations. 
4.6 Efficient SubByte Inversion 
One way to calculate the multiplicative inverse is based on the exponentiation 
operation using the addition chain as mentioned before to compute ܣିଵ = ܣଶହସ, which 
contains squares and multiplications. Our proposed idea is to start with the polynomial 
basis to perform the multiplications and whenever we face a square operation, we convert 
ܣ from the polynomial to the normal basis using (21) then perform the square using our 
efficient normal basis squaring that was described in Section  4.5 and finally convert back 
to the polynomial basis using (22). 
4.7 Integrate Secure Lookup Tables 
As mentioned in [57], to mitigate cache attacks, the authors proposed avoiding the 
use of any lookup tables, which is one way. In our proposed technique, instead of 
avoiding the use of  lookup tables we incorporated a Data-Oblivious Memory Access 
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Pattern technique, which is another way to mitigate cache attacks as described in [41]. 
The idea is that the memory access pattern must be completely oblivious to the data 
processed through the encryption process. To perform that, one reads all entries of the 
related lookup table, in fixed order, whenever any single one is needed. 
In our case, we used four small lookup tables of 16 bytes each to speed up the 
basis conversion process. Then, whenever the conversion process is needed, the 
"movaps" instruction is used to load the entire table to one XMM register (each XMM 
register can hold 16 bytes). After that, perform 16 bytes table lookup at the same time 
utilizing the "pshufb" instruction. Accordingly, we performed 16 byte lookup tables in 
parallel without losing the security level against cache attacks. 
4.8 Security Analysis 
 From [10] [13] [41], the security of our proposed technique can be easily proven. 
Moreover, we believe that the proposed countermeasure can protect AES algorithm from 
several SCA such as power analysis, electromagnetic, timing and cache attacks since we 
employ a higher-order masking scheme [13], achieving a constant-time implementation 
[10] (by using SIMD technology) and a data-oblivious memory access pattern [41]. 
4.9 Implementation Results 
We implement this efficient Multiplicative Inverse by incorporating SSSE3 
instructions with C-language. Rather than using the intrinsic functions that are easier to 
deal with, we chose inline assembly code for better performance. We replaced the 
multiplicative inverse of the S-box that was used in  CHAPTER 2. We assumed that a 
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pool of independent and uniformly distributed random masks was available securely and 
was unreachable by attackers.  
Table 4. Comparing Encryption Execution Time and Size of Lookup Tables with 
Other Schemes 
Scheme 
Cycles (×103cc) Table size(Bytes) Times 
Encryption LUT Speedup 
Original AES (Straightforward AES) 
 9.0 255  
First Order Masking 
[13] 129 3153 13.87 
[57] 13 0 1.39 
Ours 9.3 64  
Second Order Masking 
[13] 271 3845 13.89 
[57] 29 0 1.49 
Ours 19.5 64  
Third Order Masking 
[13] 470 4648 10.44 
[57] 61.7 0 1.37 
Ours 45 64  
 
For a fair comparison, we excluded the results of [52] and [58] because the S-box 
calculations were based on the composite field.  We compared our implementation results 
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with two different implementations in [13] and [57]. In [13], the higher-order masking 
scheme was implemented and the efficiency of the multiplication over GF(28) operation 
was improved using a log table. In [57], three countermeasures have been combined and 
the S-box calculations are over GF(28). The performance problem has been solved using 
SIMD technology. In our technique the square operation in S-box is computed over the 
normal basis GF(28) and efficient secure parallel lookup tables are used. However, as 
shown in Table 4, we gain a speedup of 13.87, 13.89 and 10.44 times faster than the 
existing countermeasure in [13] for first, second and third order masking, respectively. 
Our speedup is 1.39, 1.49 and 1.37 times faster than the existing countermeasure in [57] 
for first, second and third order masking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 CHAPTER 5
Case Study: AES Implementation in the OpenSSL 
Framework  
 
As part of our mission we want to chose a useful framework that suffers from 
SCAs, then deploy our techniques to protect it with acceptable performance. Thus, we 
chose the AES implementation under the OpenSSL library as our case study.  
5.1 OpenSSL 
OpenSSL [59] is an open source cryptography library that provides a robust, 
commercial-grade, and full-featured toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols. It is also a general-purpose cryptography library 
that combines many cryptographic implementation protocols. It has found wide use in 
internet web servers, serving a majority of all web sites. It is writtien in the C 
programming language. It is free to download and to use for commercial and non- 
commercial purposes, under some license conditions [60]. For security purposes, it is 
important for the OpenSSL users (developers, vendors, or individual users) to know the 
supported versions that are eligible for future security fixes. Whenever a new type of 
threat succeeds in attacking the OpenSSL library, cryptographic engineers and OpenSSL 
developers work hard to fix that vulnerable part and release a new version. Then, it is 
recommended to update the library as soon as possible to protect confidential information 
 69 
from any dangerous leak. More details about the features of each version, supported and 
unsupported versions are available in [61].  
Program developers usually use the OpenSSL library to add strong cryptography 
features to their programs. On the other hand, it is also a powerful command line tool and 
can be used by shell scripts [62]. OpenSSL binary affords command-line access to many 
cryptographic operations and applications such as: 
 openssl dgst – to produce a digest of a file using hash functions or digital 
signature algorithms. 
 openssl enc – to encrypt or decrypt data using various symmetric block and 
stream ciphers. 
 openssl speed – to test the performance of any supported cryptographic 
algorithms. 
 openssl s_client – a TCP and TLS client, which is able to connect to a remote 
host. 
 openssl s_time – a client which benchmarks the performance of a TLS 
connection. 
Moreover, OpenSSL library supports many cryptographic algorithms such as: 
 openssl list-message-digest-algorithms. 
 openssl list-cipher-algorithms. 
 openssl list-public-key-algorithms. 
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5.2 Motivations 
The Intel Atom processor is part of Intel’s x86-64 family, which supports the 
SSSE3 optimization instruction set and hence consumes low power. These processors are 
widely used in everyday small devices such as smartphones and netbooks. 
In [14] the authors report that they mounted an electromagnetic SCA on the 
OpenSSL implementation of the AES algorithm and were able to retrieve part of the 
secret key. Their project used an Intel Atom processor. Moreover, in [16] the authors 
successfully mounted a cache timing SCA on OpenSSL implementation of the AES 
algorithm they were able to recover the full secret key. They targeted a Pentium III 
processor. In [8] the authors succeed in performing electromagnetic attacks on modern 
laptop and desktop systems with various Intel processors. Those issues inspired us to 
produce a combined countermeasure to mitigate different types of attack using Intel 
SSSE3 instructions in modern Intel processors, and any other processor that supports 
SIMD technology. 
Our techneques are investigated in terms of performance metrics which in our 
case are the number of clock cycles (execution time), table size (area overhead) and 
speedup. To verify our work, we implemented all the discussed countermeasures of AES 
by incorporating SSSE3 instructions with C language and incorporated them under the 
OpenSSL library in a Linux machine. Moreover, instead of using the intrinsic functions 
(to levarage SSSE3 instructions with C code) that are easier to deal with, we chose inline 
assembly code for better performance but that required us to manage register usage and 
do instruction scheduling. 
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 CHAPTER 6
Conclusions 
In  CHAPTER 2 we addressed the problem of producing, for AES, a leakage free 
countermeasure against multiple side channel attacks (differential power analysis, 
electromagnetic, timing and cache attacks) at the same time maintaining a reasonable and 
practical speed, by combining more than one countermeasure (high order masking 
scheme, constant time implementation, and avoidance of lookup tables) to mitigate more 
than one type of SCA. Then, we solved the penalty on performance as a result of 
combining those countermeasures by implementing our scheme using SIMD technology 
(to gain the advantage of data-level parallelism). The speed of our implementation makes 
it more practical for use by the real world applications and hence attractive. 
In  CHAPTER 3 we addressed the problem of increasing the performance of the 
bottleneck transformation (SubByte transformation) while maintaining the same level of 
security, by apply enhancement techniques in three different levels: 
1. Algorithm Level: evaluating the SubByte using a composite field, where 
carrying out the computations over GF(24) is much faster that over GF(28).  
Moreover, accomplishing multiple operations while incurring only the 
cost of one. 
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2. Byte Level: Take advantage of the parallel computing by using Single 
Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) technology to achieve data level 
parallelism. 
3. Bit Level: Deriving the formulas for each bit of each operation (if 
applicable), to minimize the amount of required calculations. 
 
In  CHAPTER 4 we addressed the problem of increasing the performance of the 
first operation in the bottleneck transformation (SubByte transformation) the 
multiplicative inverse operation with the same level of security by: 
1. Utilizing the squaring property of the normal basis [55], where the square in 
normal basis is just a cyclic shift left. 
2. Solving the basis conversion problem and minimizing the previously required 
extensive calculations using Karnaugh maps [54] and Boolean algebra. 
3. Utilizing SIMD technology, which can manipulate 16 bytes concurrently, to 
achieve data level parallelism [56]. 
4. Taking advantage of the "pshufb" instruction to design an enhanced 
countermeasure against cache attacks, which performs Data-Oblivious Memory 
Access Pattern technique instead of Avoid Using any Lookup Tables technique. 
In  CHAPTER 5 we verify our work by applying our techniques in the OpenSSL 
implementation of the AES algorithm as a real world, very important and useful 
application. 
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